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Delegate Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention: 








How did the economic interests of the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention impact 
delegate voting before and after the resolution of the Great Compromise? This research introduces 
the use of a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority as the dependent variable in a model that 
divides the Convention into two periods around the Compromise. Covariates include several 
measures of a delegate’s economic interest, proxies for his personal ideology, and controls for his 
place of origin. Results indicate that three economic interests (owning a greater number of slaves, a 
home county further from navigable water, and holding public securities) significantly impacted the 
likelihood of a delegate voting contrary to the majority position of his state in a way that was not the 
same before and after the Compromise. These results imply not only that personal economic 
interests were significant players during the creation of the U.S. Constitution, but that the structure 
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The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, a room full of demi-gods, conspirers in a 
Devil’s Bargain—all ascriptions given throughout the lifetime of the United States to a group of 
nothing more and nothing less than an assortment of humans charged with the impressive mission 
of creating the United States. The results of the debates of the 1787 Constitutional Convention 
continue to have critical significance on the lives of people within the United States and beyond; 
thus, studying these roots of our political system remains relevant when thinking critically about the 
current political reality. I contribute an empirical perspective to the litany of qualitative and 
quantitative literature on the topic of the Constitution by posing these questions: How might 
economic interests have affected delegates’ voting behavior at the 1787 Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia? Are these interests reflected by a change in voting patterns after the Great 
Compromise? Might these interests have led delegates to deviate from their states’ majority 
positions?  
Charles Beard’s 1913 work An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution introduced the notion that 
the Constitution is an economic document—that it can be viewed as a contention between the 
various economic interests of the Founders, instead of as an untarnished emblem of Enlightenment 
principles. While Beard’s specific hypothesis has not withstood over a century of critical review, his 
idea of an “Economic Constitution” lives on. Empirical work testing a wide range of hypotheses 
regarding how economic and ideological interests may have informed voting at the Convention 
consistently suggests that delegate-specific economic characteristics were significant influencers of 
voting at the Convention, especially on issues related to those interests.  
My research stands apart from the existing empirical literature on delegate voting by its unique 
combination of three specific components: a dependent variable that is free of researcher-imposed 
subjectivity, a model that encompasses, rather than bypasses, the temporal dimension of the 
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convention, and the utilization of a recently compiled dataset that is arguably the most 
comprehensive, yet still true to its primary source, as is feasible.  
I use two datasets in this paper. Professor Keith Dougherty of the University of Georgia 
provided a full range of descriptive data for each of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention and 
for each of the twelve attending states (Rhode Island chose not to attend the Convention). I 
obtained a second dataset giving state votes and inferring delegate positions (“yea” or “nay”) on the 
620 substantive roll calls throughout the Convention from the Constitutional Convention Research 
Group (CCRG). The positions of the individual men are crucial to understanding voting at the 
delegate level, but these positions are difficult or in some cases impossible to know; the delegates did 
not vote as individuals during the Convention. Instead, they each voted within their state’s 
delegation, and each state voiced its position to the general assembly. Official Convention records 
therefore list only the state votes, not those of the delegates. This fact required an extensive 
examination of primary source records by Dougherty et al (2012), who have produced the most 
exhaustive collection of the individual delegate positions currently feasible. These data are relatively 
new in the empirical literature on the Convention, and so advantage my analysis over earlier studies 
of the Convention.   
It is on Dougherty’s compilation of individual delegate positions that I base the binary 
dependent variable of my logistic regression model—an indicator that equals one if a delegate 
deviates from his state’s majority on any particular vote, and zero if he votes with his state’s 
majority. Through a slight alteration to the theoretical model presented by McGuire (2003), the 
event of a delegate deviating from his state’s majority is a powerful indicator of a delegate’s personal 
interests in voting. McGuire’s model and my own cast a delegate’s voting as a function of two broad 
categories of interest: delegate-specific interests (such as the number of slaves owned by a delegate 
or his religion) and state-specific interests (such as state population and the number of slaves per 
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capita). To tailor McGuire’s general model to the dependent variable here, I construe an increase in 
the likelihood of a delegate’s deviating from his state’s majority position to indicate an increase in 
the influence of some characteristic he does not necessarily share with his fellow state delegates.  For 
the purposes of this paper, I am particularly focusing on the delegate-specific interests that are 
economic in nature.  
No other author has directly measured a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority as a metric 
of his personal interest. There are studies that use a small sample of votes, or that utilize spatial 
modeling techniques to discern similarity in voting between any of the delegates. Of these, the 
former is incapable of speaking to voting patterns of a Convention that continuously evolved over 
its four-month span, and the latter (a close cousin of my measure of a delegate’s similarity to his 
fellows) is less equipped to test hypotheses on specific delegate characteristics. Other pooled 
regression models do reach across a wide range of votes by coding them as a one or a zero based on 
whether they are “pro-national” or not. However, this imposes an inherent subjectivity onto the 
data—it requires the researcher to make the content-based decision of how to label each vote 
according to a binary metric. My method can apply to almost1 the full set of individual delegate 
positions—for a total of 4,870 observations—without bending any data away from the primary 
source.  
The vote later deemed the “Great Compromise” constitutes the break around which I model a 
logistic regression of this binary measure of deviation. Prior to the Great Compromise, it was 
unknown whether legislative seats would be apportioned to each state evenly, or instead according 
to population. The decision that came with the 156th roll-call vote of the Convention—that there 
would be a Senate in which two senators represented each state, regardless of its size, and a House 
 
1 I cannot measure a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority in the 118 cases in which the delegate’s position is 
known, but the state vote is “divided” between yeas and nays. I correct for this in the model by controlling for whether a 
delegation is an even number in size, for this would directly speak to the likelihood of an even split of his delegation.  
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of Representatives with membership apportioned by the size of their state—imparted to each 
delegate at the Convention the knowledge of where in the legislative hierarchy he and his state 
would stand. As historical analyses on the intricacies of the Convention reveal, the issue of legislative 
apportionment was crucial in several other simultaneously occurring debates—most significantly, 
those regarding the commercial powers of the new government, how to address the admission of 
new states into the Union, and of course the ever-present (though sometimes not explicitly 
mentioned) debate over slavery (Collier et al (1986)). An extensive examination of these debates 
suggests the question underlying my empirical analysis: Before a delegate knows how much power 
his state will hold in the new federal government, how can he know what other constitutional 
arrangements will best benefit himself and his state?  
I do not mean to imply that the only mover of a delegate’s position during the Convention was a 
purely selfish or self-interested motive. However, scholarship consistently suggests that delegates’ 
personal interests significantly influence their votes on issues related to those interests. This is the 
basis on which to imagine the Great Compromise as a key piece of information in the Convention, 
and one directly related to patterns in delegates’ economic interests. I hypothesize that a delegate’s 
likelihood to deviate from his state’s majority changes with the Great Compromise. The direction I 
expect the change in voting patterns after the Great Compromise to take is ambiguous—whether a 
delegate’s economic interests (or any specific interest) would be more or less impactful on his 
probability of deviation after the Compromise. 
The covariates of this model fall into three categories: economic variables, noneconomic 
variables, and structural controls. The economic variables are those of analytic primary interest—
delegate-specific indicators of wealth and economic standing include: the number of slaves a 
delegate owned, whether he owned public or private securities, whether he owned Western land, and 
the distance from the center of his home county to navigable water (a measure of his shipping and 
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commercial interest). The effects of these variables on a delegate’s probability of deviating from his 
state’s majority position are estimated in each of the two periods, to test the hypothesis that in each 
period their impact on a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority differs. The noneconomic 
variables included in the regression are not modelled in two periods before and after the 
Compromise, as their purpose is to control for other individual characteristics that might have 
influenced a delegate’s probability of deviating from his state’s majority. These variables are: a 
delegate’s age, his years of legislative, executive, and judicial experience, and dummy variables for 
English ancestry, holding an officer role in the Revolutionary War, and religion. Lastly, the structural 
controls account for the size of the delegation and also whether its size is an even number, as both 
could impact the likelihood of a delegate’s deviation.  
Results indicate that owning a greater number of slaves and origins in a county further from 
navigable water each increases the likelihood of a delegate voting contrary to the majority position of 
his state after (and only after) the Compromise. The model also shows that delegates who own 
public securities are more likely to deviate before (and only before) the Compromise. These results 
support the hypothesis concerning a difference between the two periods in how economic interests 
manifest themselves in delegate voting. Additionally, delegates who subscribe to a hierarchical 
religion (Catholic, Episcopalian) are significantly more likely to deviate from their state’s majority 
throughout the entire Convention, as well as delegates who were former officers in the 
Revolutionary War.   
An examination of the marginal effects of the economic characteristics, pre- and post-, reveals 
that these factors were not hugely significant movers of a delegate’s actual probability of deviation in 
the context of this empirical model. However, the consistent nature of the significance still suggests 
an important impact of these variables.  Countless forces laid their mark on these debates, and 
obscured instances of a delegate voting his true interests—biasing results against any results. The 
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fact that some variables nonetheless emerge as significant here is more meaningful in this context. 
The results of these empirical tests stand on the side of an economic interpretation of the 
Constitution, and also act illustratively to the specific story around the Great Compromise.  
Section 2, 3, 4, and 5 summarize the historical, epistemological, empirical, and theoretical 
background on the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention, and my specific hypotheses, 
respectively. Section 6 describes the data, and in Section 7 I specify my model and empirical strategy. 
In Section 8, I present my results, and in Section 9, I discuss their implication. Section 10 concludes 
this research.  
2 Historical Background on the Constitutional Convention 
The Revolutionary War won from England the independence of thirteen sovereign states, not 
that of a single country.  The union of the early 1780s resembled the modern United Nations more 
closely than our current United States in many ways: States issued their own currencies and could 
impose tariffs on one other, and the central body—a Confederation Congress which met to discuss 
issues common to all thirteen states—lacked both an executive branch and any means of enforcing 
its requisitions for taxes. Danger loomed from all sides: England and Spain presented continual 
threats to independence, and domestic economic difficulties verged into social crises, a phenomenon 
particularly apparent in the event of Shays Rebellion2. 
The political leaders of the day found the Articles of Confederation, which governed the states 
during the Revolutionary War and the years immediately following, deeply deficient for that 
precarious moment of history. The Annapolis Convention, attended by James Madison and 
 
2 Shays Rebellion took place in Massachusetts in the Spring of 1787, just before the Convention began. Men thrown into 
debtors’ prison as victims of a highly volatile economic period took it upon themselves to fight back, led by Daniel 
Shays. Its significance here lies in how for many contemporaries Shays Rebellion was the tipping point towards belief in 
the necessity of a new system of government, as no federal force was able to stop the rebellion—it was the 
Massachusetts state militia that did (Collier).  
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Alexander Hamilton, among others, met in the Fall of 1786 to discuss a solution and resolved to call 
a general convention the following summer in Philadelphia for the sole purpose of proposing 
amendments to the Articles. Over the four-month convention, however, these delegates far 
overreached this directive and created an entirely new system of government, which endures to the 
present—the longest lasting Constitution in modern history. 
The Convention met in secrecy, and from the first debate allowed for the reconsideration of any 
resolution at any point. Representing twelve states (Rhode Island chose not to attend), these fifty-
five men held diverse political experience and opinions on human nature. However, they were 
uniform in the sense that each held a generally federalist (supportive of a strong central government, 
as opposed to advocating the prioritization of state sovereignty) attitude and a level of political 
recognition sufficient to gain appointment to his state’s delegation. These men were not 
representatives in that they were appointed (not elected) by their state legislatures (except for the 
delegates from South Carolina, appointed by their governor), and they did not face reelection, since 
the Convention met only once. However, the delegates bore some accountability for their actions in 
Philadelphia—each knew that he would eventually bring whatever the Convention produced back to 
his state, and that his pre-existing political career might suffer or thrive according to the 
Constitution’s reception.   
Thomas Jefferson, who did not attend the Convention, dubbed it an “assembly of demi-gods,” 
and as these men embarked on the incredibly complicated and convoluted Philadelphia project, they 
knew the momentous place in history the house of cards they built would occupy. Slowly and 
laboriously, these men debated various plans of government, represented in the 620 substantive roll 
call votes held throughout the Convention. The delegates voted based on the information given by 
the cumulative process of the convention, and so while many of these roll calls posed questions 
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nearly identical in denotation, their connotations imbibed the particular context of that vote’s place 
in the series.  
Between two (New Hampshire) and eight (Virginia) delegates represented each state. While the 
states together appointed seventy-five men, only fifty-five ever made it to Philadelphia, because of 
travel complications, illness, participation in the concurrent Continental Congress in New York, or 
another obligation. Both the individual delegates and whole delegations were inconsistent in their 
attendance—never did all twelve states reach simultaneous quorum3, and never were more than 42 
delegates present on a particular day. Two men (counted in the 55)—George Houstoun of New 
Jersey and George Wythe of Virginia —departed within the first two weeks of the Convention, 
never to return. New Hampshire did not arrive until July 23rd, and New York lost its quorum in early 
July with the departure of John Lansing and Robert Yates, leaving Alexander Hamilton its sole 
quorum-less yet outspoken voice.  
Discussions covered many subjects, but the issue of representation troubled the delegates from 
the first meeting.  As a feature of the sovereign nature of the states under the Articles, each state 
held equal voice in the Confederation Congress.  Legislation required approval of nine states, 
amendments all thirteen.  Delegates from states large in population deemed this distinctly 
undemocratic, as it allowed a small state to exert a hugely disproportionate influence on the large. 
James Madison, representing Virginia, entered the Convention with a comprehensive plan of 
government featuring a bicameral legislature with the members of each house apportioned relative 
to state population. The delegates opened substantive discussion in late May with this Virginia Plan. 
To the consternation of Madison and his fellow large-state-hailing representatives, however, the 
delegates from the smaller states considered a legislature based in proportional representation just as 
 
3 The number that constituted a quorum was decided by the legislature of each state individually.  
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inequitable as the large states found the current Continental Congress.  From their perspective, a 
government of this form would render them totally impotent to the whims of the larger states.  
At several points, whole small-state delegations approached the point of quitting the Convention 
and abandoning the infant Constitution entirely over this issue. Idiosyncratic attendance, reasoned 
discussion, and deals made on the floor as well as (probably) at the Indian Queen Tavern all played 
their role in progress on resolving legislative representation. The Convention first resolved in favor 
of a bicameral legislature, then on proportional representation in the lower house (the House of 
Representatives). Finally came the decision on representation in the upper house (the Senate), which 
allowed each state an equal voice. This final point, called the Great Compromise, settled on July 
16—about halfway through the convention. Such was the controversial and heated nature of the 
debates leading up to the Compromise that the delegates knew that this deal was the only way to 
keep the Convention alive, and so they understood this 156th roll call vote as the final word on the 
issue, with no option for reconsideration. From here forward, each delegate knew his state’s 
forecasted representation in the legislative branch. For example, a delegate from Virginia could 
expect ten representatives in the first House of Representatives, a delegate from Delaware could 
expect one, and all delegates knew two Senators would represent his state in the upper house. This 
compromise holds great significance, both for its controversy during the convention and in its 
permanent effect on the U.S. government. It is a key piece in the balance of power within the 
Federal government, and between the state and central governments. 
Following the passage of the Great Compromise, the Convention deliberated other elements of 
the new government until September 17, 1787, when 39 delegates finally stood up to sign the 
finished Constitution of the United States. On this day, Benjamin Franklin closed the meeting with 
words that rang home to the men who had fought and compromised in Philadelphia that summer: 
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“Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution, because I expect no better, and I am not sure that it is not 
the best.” 
After months of exhaustive debate in state ratification conventions, the people of New 
Hampshire resolved in favor of the Constitution on June 21, 1788 – the last of the minimum nine 
states needed for the document to go into effect. A necessary contingent of state legislatures ratified 
the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the Constitution, and an understood condition for a 
ratification vote from some states—in 1791. Seventeen additional amendments, a Civil War, and 
over two hundred years of politics have altered the text of the Constitution and its place in our 
society. However, the core structure and function of the current United States government exists by 
the invention made over those four long, hot, summer months in Philadelphia.  
3 Approaches to Understanding the Constitutional Convention 
The discipline of studying the Constitution and the Founding is a history unto itself, akin in its 
place in the body of legal knowledge to the actual development of the United States as a political 
society. Only a handful of empirical studies of the relationship between economic interests and 
voting choices exist amidst the hundreds of studies of the Convention and the thousands of studies 
on the Constitution itself. In this section, I summarize the rise of economic and empirical 
interpretations of the Constitution, and in the next I describe how the findings of these studies 
inform the specific hypotheses and methods of this research.  
Charles Beard is recognized as the first author in the field of economic interpretations of the 
Constitution. In 1913, he published An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, a contemporarily 
controversial work because it highlighted the “demi” half of Jefferson’s label, after a century of 
scholarship focused on the latter and “god”-like characterization.  Beard identified a dichotomy 
between the delegates attending the Convention that owed money in some form, and those who 
held the debt of others. He suggested that creditors would support a strong national government as 
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reassurance of an eventual repayment, and that debtors conversely preferred the higher potential for 
leniency implied by a system that favored the supremacy of state legislatures. Still, Beard pioneered 
the idea of the Constitution as an economic document—that it exists by the delegates channeling the 
economic as well as political forces of their day. While different in specific hypotheses, Beard’s 
thesis and my own share the general theoretical assumption that the economic interests of the 
Founders influenced their voting.  
Since 1913, legal, political, and historical analyses of Constitutional origins make close to 
unanimous arguments against the specifics of Beard’s An Economic Interpretation. Forrest McDonald’s 
1958 We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution took an empirical approach to evaluating 
Beard’s thesis, the first quantitative study in the field. He analyzed the proceedings of both the 1787 
Philadelphia Convention and the thirteen state ratifying conventions in exhaustive detail. McDonald 
finds a convincing empirical basis for an economic interpretation, but also reiterates Beard’s point 
that one cannot understand the creation of the U.S. Constitution through any single lens, and that 
the economic motives of the founders are only some among many forces that lead to the document 
the Convention finally produced. McDonald’s call for a multi-disciplinary examination 
contextualizes the empirical limitations of this research.  
Empirical works examining voting behavior at the Constitutional Convention since McDonald 
are relatively few, and so each substantially builds from the conclusions and data of the preceding. 
They fall into two broad categories: analysis of action at the state level, and at the delegate level. 
Data on the state positions throughout the Convention is much easier to obtain—the Convention 
Journal, kept by Secretary William Samuel Jackson (who did not vote) gives fairly comprehensive 
information on the state positions throughout the meeting. For this reason, the earlier empirical 
analyses do not speak to the behavior of the individual delegates, as is the goal of my research. 
Regardless, their examinations of the general forces at play during the Convention are relevant here, 
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especially the studies that examine how information conditions varied throughout the four months 
of the Convention.  
A series of works by Jillison et al (1978, 1981, 1984) does just this—he looks to changes in state 
voting patterns, or changes in the composition of state voting blocs, as evidence of the political 
forces and economic interests that were relevant during the Convention. These three works all use a 
factor analysis technique, and their results, discussed below, inform my hypothesis that the Great 
Compromise significantly influenced voting during the Convention.  
From 1984 onwards, McGuire shifts the focus in the empirical literature towards analysis of the 
delegate (not state) behavior. As I will describe shortly, these early models are interesting in their 
ability to analyze specific economic and ideological characteristics of the delegates but are limited in 
scope. Research using spatial analysis techniques (Heckelman et al (2013), Pope et al (2015)) expand 
the potential for meaningful inference at the delegate level. These studies show that economic 
interests manifested during the convention, particularly on issues pertaining directly to those 
interests. Lastly, the dataset of delegate votes I use here, compiled by Dougherty et al (2012), 
represents an invaluable contribution to the field of empirical work on the Constitutional 
Convention. I detail the aspects of these empirical studies directly relevant to my work in the coming 
section.  
4 Hypothesis Placed in the Context of History and the Literature 
In this section, I will explain the narrative behind the empirical hypotheses I will come to test, 
and the intuition behind the methods and variables I use. The story this research tells is one that 
combines economic theory of the study of information-conditional decision making, with the 
historical course of the Convention. Namely, it focuses on the mind of the individual delegate, and it 
investigates how the various interests and experiences he brings could change over the course of the 
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meeting. These are not new ideas. What Charles Beard introduced and Forrest McDonald 
developed, empirical work has tested and augmented.  
The details of how economic interests impacted the creation of the Constitution lie in both 
empirical and subjective dispute. However, there is a common theme from Beard to the present: 
that there was something going on at the Convention other than simply a meeting of wills and minds 
on even playing ground. Informative lines of analysis stem from nuances that any delegate himself 
would have perceived, such as decisions already made by the Convention or how his words and 
votes would strategically fall into the room as a whole. Given the unbroachable obstacle of a lack of 
exhaustive4 primary-source data on the individual delegates, these uncertainties will probably never 
reach undisputed resolve. So, in forming my hypothesis, I consider the best way to use the data I 
have to address these intricacies of the Convention and still yield telling information on how 
economic interests of the Founders manifested in their voting at the Convention. I discuss how best 
to harness the nature of the data at hand through the creation of my dependent variable, explained 
in section 4.1. I address the entanglement of delegate behavior depends and the informational 
environment through my two-period analysis, described in section 4.2.  
4.1 Measuring Deviation from the State Majority 
Voting at the Convention occurred at two levels: The delegates first voted within their individual 
delegations, and the majority position of the delegation voted to the Convention as a whole, and that 
was what determined the passage or failure of any particular motion. I am using a delegate’s 
deviation from his state’s majority position as the binary dependent variable in a logistic regression 
model. Here, I explain why by exploring how this dependent variable is both empirically more 
 
4 As I will soon describe, the dataset of individual delegate positions is arguably the most exhaustive feasible, yet still it 
gives only 20% of all potential individual delegate positions.  
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robust than other alternatives in the literature and posit its capability to shed light onto the delegates’ 
behavior at the convention. 
The first few ventures into empirical examinations of delegate behavior at the individual level are 
variations on one combination of theme and method: The author first ascertains the individual 
delegate positions for each vote in the set of sixteen roll-call votes McDonald (1958) deemed the 
most critical during the Convention. The author then (subjectively) decides whether a “yea” vote on 
each measure represents a “pro-national” (coded “1”) or the reverse (coded “0”), enabling the 
pooling of the resulting positions. McGuire (1984) uses this method in a pooled logit regression to 
test whether certain economic interests were significantly related to delegates supporting the 
formation of a stronger central government than other interests. In 1986, McGuire et al conduct a 
similar study, but augment any missing individual delegate positions with imputations based on 
attendance records under the assumption that a man would have voted “pro-national” if he signed 
the finished Constitution. McGuire again in a 2003 book fleshes out a theoretical model of voting 
behavior that he tests using these sixteen votes again along the “pro-national” axis. Finally, in 2007, 
Heckelman et al provide a check on the natural monopoly McGuire had held in the “marketplace of 
ideas” of empirical models of delegate voting behavior by directly reviewing McGuire’s methods and 
testing his hypotheses using slightly different observations of delegate votes or definitions of their 
characteristic covariates. This study confirmed previous findings that personal interests were 
important in voting during the Convention, but that the influence of constituent interests had been 
overstated by previous literature. In 2008 Dougherty et al again take a few votes and compress them 
into a binary to measure how interests manifest, but instead with a specific eye towards votes 
concerning slavery.  
The results of these studies give statistical support to the notion that economic interests did 
manifest in voting at the Convention. Findings regarding the significance of specific variables 
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certainly inform my choices as to which covariates are relevant to my model. However, these studies 
all carry the two inherent and fundamental flaws that I attempt to avoid in creating the dependent 
variable here.  First, the alignment of votes along a content-based axis such as “pro-national” or 
“pro-slavery” is subjective in nature. It assumes that there is just one central dichotomy that the 
Convention is “about,” an issue myriad political scholars and a few empirical researchers have 
consistently failed to resolve. While the “pro-national” distinction certainly did apply to many votes 
and does address a real and contentious issue during the Convention, these works give that line of 
thought an inappropriately large amount of weight.  Additionally, using only a few votes—16 out of 
620 is a small fraction—poses great risk to meaningful statistical inference. Many studies rely on the 
same sample of 16 votes, risking missing information that this sample may not capture.  
In 2013, Heckelman and Dougherty harnessed the power of a new and exhaustive dataset of 
delegate inferences to break away from the earlier technique and created a spatial model of delegate 
voting throughout the Convention—calculating how closely any two delegates voted to each other 
and thus creating a spatial “map” of Convention voting. In analyzing the proximities of delegate 
votes, the work here allows for the concurrent analysis of many roll-call votes without obscuring the 
raw data. While this method addresses the two central flaws of the technique that aligned a small 
subset of votes around a single axis, it does not lend itself quite as well to analysis of the impact of 
economic interests as covariates as a logistic regression. To color in their analysis with delegate-
specific data, then, these authors compare the spatial mapping results with the historical data on 
delegate characteristics to look for patterns. Several variables emerged as significantly related to the 
relative positions of the delegates. 
The utilization of spatial modeling to analyze the delegates to the Convention supports my 
choice in dependent variable because both consider the similarity and dissimilarity of delegate votes 
as a valid metric by which to measure some trend or pattern. In a sense, by measuring whether a 
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delegate deviated from his state’s majority on any vote, I am performing a two-factor spatial analysis 
for every observation. Both the spatial modeling technique and my own circumvent the issue 
inherent in classifying votes on a preconceived scale when there is no consensus on what that scale 
should be. Additionally, a delegate’s choice of deviating from his state’s majority is both concrete 
and one he himself would perceive. Heckelman (2013) point out another flaw in classifying votes on 
a preconceived scale: that “the delegates must perceive the underlying dimension to be the same as 
the one identified by the researcher in order for the scale to be accurate.” While “How will my 
decision affect the balance of power between the states and the central government” certainly went 
through the mind of every delegate to the Convention at some point, no researcher can claim that 
that thought always took forefront for every delegate for every vote. However, a delegate would 
know how his voice would fall within his own delegation. Legal appointment and situational 
solidarity tied together the men of each delegation, and the delegates discussed their positions within 
their delegation before casting votes. While the actions of the rest of his delegations was not a 
delegate’s only consideration when voting, certainly he perceived his place within the group for 
every vote.   
The binary variable (denoted state_dev) that indicates whether a delegate deviated from his state’s 
majority on each vote is also strong because it allows me to use every substantive vote in the 
Convention without convoluting the content of the data. The data on individual delegate positions, 
which I describe in great detail in Section 6, gives only 20% of all potential individual positions 
(5,121 out of the 25,928 Dougherty et al (2012) estimate existed overall), due to the practical 
impossibility of knowing historical facts that primary sources do not give. Comparing a delegate’s 
position to that of his state allows use of close to the full set of 5,121 delegate position observations 
(there are 251 cases in which the authors have inferred a delegate’s position, but not that of his state, 
bringing our number of total observations to 4,870). While this is still far fewer than the total 
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number of individual delegate votes that must have been cast, I argue that this set is close to 
complete in capturing significant instances of delegate dissensions: When the basis for the data is 
primary source records that is notes taken by the delegates, it follows that the available information 
is biased towards events that are somehow noteworthy, in the literal sense of the word. A delegate’s 
deviating from his state majority certainly falls into this category.  
The question of why a delegate would deviate from his state’s majority is crucial to using the 
state_dev dependent variable for meaningful inference. The theoretical model of voting behavior 
developed by McGuire (2003) leads into this explanation. He models a delegate’s choice of position 
on any given roll-call—“yea” or “nay”—as a utility function of two general categories: Personal 
Interests and Constituent Interests, as represented by vectors 𝑃𝑗 and 𝐶𝑘. He considers Personal 
Interests as the ideas and experiences held by each individual delegate, and Constituent Interests the 
general wants of the people of that delegate’s state.  So, for delegate j, issue i, and state k, a delegate’s 
vote V is given by:  
𝑉𝑖
𝑗𝑘
= 𝑔(𝑃𝑗 , 𝐶𝑘)      ( 1 ) 
 
Under this framework, the event of a delegate’s deviating from his state’s majority position would 
represent an occurrence of the Personal Interests outstripping the Constituent. If these are the two 
factors that go into a vote, and a delegate does not vote with his state, then there must be some 
personal interest at play, for in all other ways he and his fellow state delegates are identical.  
A caveat regarding language: The terms “Personal” and “Constituent” are derived from 
McGuire’s model, and are better understood as the “delegate-specific” and the “state-wide” 
interests, to address whether they pertain to a characteristic that varies by the delegate or by the 
state. McGuire’s terminology is misleading for the purposes of this paper for two reasons: Firstly, 
the term “Constituent” is inappropriate here because it implies that the delegates are electorally 
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accountable for their actions, which they were not—their presence at the Convention was by 
appointment, not election. Additionally, these more technical labels allow more breathing room for 
the potential scope of the covariate characteristics to influence a delegate’s decision to deviate or 
not: For example, a delegate-specific characteristic such as his religion might influence him to 
construe the interests of the people of his state differently than the rest of his delegation, causing 
him to vote against them. In this scenario, he still would be acting out of a delegate-specific interest, 
even if it was applied to his constituency.  
Under this understanding of the place of state_dev in the theoretical model, using delegate 
deviations as a measure of delegate-specific economic interests is appropriate and meaningful. As I 
describe the importance of accounting for the model’s temporal dimension in the next section, I also 
outline how a delegate’s deviation, as it is understood here, and the Great Compromise, are fitting 
partners in an empirical model.  
4.2 A Two-Period Analysis 
The Great Compromise was the decision that settled how each state would be represented in the 
Legislative Branch. An issue of incredible controversy from the Convention’s outset, its resolution 
imparted to each delegate the knowledge of where his state would one day stand in the legislative 
hierarchy of the new government. Delegates from smaller states could hope for as much as one 
thirteenth of the new Legislature, and feared the potential of a negligibly small fraction, if the larger 
states should succeed. On the other side of the debate, the delegates from the larger states were 
eager for as much legislative power as the Convention would allow.  
My hypothesis rests on the same assumption that Beard introduces, and that the rest of the 
empirical literature consistently supports—that economic interests were significant in the 
Philadelphia debates. From here, I hypothesize that the manifestation of these economic interests 
was not constant throughout the Convention. Further, I posit that this fluctuation was a function of 
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how those interests were related to the content of the deliberation in question. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that the resolution of the Great Compromise impacted the information condition at the 
Convention to the extent that the relationship between delegate economic interests and delegate 
voting would also change across the two periods. In this section, I first describe the literature 
supporting the outlook on voting at the Convention as a phenomenon that was not fixed over its 
course. I then outline the specific way I hypothesize the economic interests of the delegates would 
change with the Compromise.  
The Nonfixed Nature of the Relationship Between a Delegate’s Voting and his Economic Interests 
The authors that incorporate a time dimension into their projects studying voting behavior 
(Jillison (1978, 1981, 1984) and Pope (2011)) inherently suggest a relationship between time and 
economic interests. Notably for this research, all of these authors also identify the Great 
Compromise as a notable event in their empirical work. Jillison et al (1984) speak to why a delegate’s 
economic interest might vary over time. They suggest that in order for a person to strategically 
manipulate a system to their own benefit, it is first necessary to understand to some degree what 
shape that system will take. Specifically, they illustrate how the personal interests of the delegates 
fluctuated in manifested impact throughout the Convention, by positing a difference between two 
types of decisions: those regarding structural issues in the new government and those that regard the 
more operational matters. For example, establishing how power would balance between the three 
branches of government is a structural decision, while deciding how old a person must be before 
running for President would occur on the operational level. Through a factor analysis of roll call 
votes that divided the Convention into five periods, as well as a qualitative analysis of the content of 
discussions, these authors concluded that the “material” (practical politics or economic) interests 
more manifested at the “operational” level, while the “rational” (ideas and political principles) 
interests influenced discussion at the structural level. These authors conclude that “some measure of 
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detachment was possible at the ‘higher’ level of constitutional choice because the debates over 
general principles provided little indication of precisely how the choice of one set of principles over 
another would affect the specific interests of particular individuals, states, or regions.” These 
conclusions relate to the hypothesis regarding the Great Compromise’s impact on how personal 
economic interests manifest in voting at the Convention because they speak to how the expression 
of a delegate’s economic interests are not necessarily fixed but are instead dependent on his 
perception of how that vote would fall into the context of the Convention at that moment. 
Other empirical work supports the second underlying part of my hypothesis—that a delegate’s 
voting based on his economic interests changes with the proceedings of the Convention. While 
studies using only a small subset of votes are ill-equipped to encompass the full breadth of the 
Convention debates, they do reveal telling information about those particular votes. McGuire (1986) 
found that “…personal and constituent interests affected voting behavior on particular issues 
primarily when the interests could be significantly advanced by the outcome.”  
These two pieces—that the impact of economic interests on voting varied over the course of the 
convention, and that the variance was in reaction to the content of the debates—taken together 
support the theory and intuition behind my specific hypothesis: that a delegate’s likelihood to 
deviate from his state’s majority changes with the Great Compromise.  
The Great Compromise Hypothesis 
The direction I expect the change in voting patterns after the Great Compromise to take is 
ambiguous. In describing the theoretical model in Equation 1, I identify how a delegate deviating 
can be taken as his voting out of personal, rather than constituent, interest. However, it is not clear 
whether the circumstances would indicate a delegate being more likely, or less likely, to vote out of 
his personal interest after the Great Compromise than before. Another obfuscating caveat lies in the 
difference between the theoretical model and what one would observe in voting at the Convention: 
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The model in Equation 1 identifies delegate deviation as an observation of his voting by some 
characteristic he does not share with the other members of his delegation—here cast as voting out 
of his economic interest. This interpretation does not address that a delegate voting with his state 
majority also could represent strategic voting, motivated by economic interests. As Jillison et al 
(1978) empirically show through a factor analysis of state voting blocs, in the lead-up to the Great 
Compromise the states as units were strategic players that formed alliances with each other based on 
common interests or quid-pro-quos. As each vied for power in the legislative branch—its main 
outlet for hopes of dominance (as compared to the Executive or Judicial)—the decision of the 
individual to deviate or acquiesce bore more weight, for in those instances, a delegate had to take 
into consideration the place of his state amidst a web of alliances. For example, a delegate might 
vote with his state in order to support a voting bloc he thought would benefit his state, even if that 
decision itself countered his own economic interest.  
Contending stories could explain a delegate being both more and less likely to deviate before and 
after the Great Compromise, while remaining within the theoretical model. After the Compromise 
was made, a delegate might perceive less importance in voting in solidarity with his state’s 
delegation, and be more likely to vote to his own interest. On the other hand, in line with Jillison 
(1984), certainty with regard to future legislative representation would create an environment with 
more opportunity for leveraging any particular economic interest, incentivizing a delegate to vote 
accordingly. Discerning voting patterns is convoluted still further by the reality that each of these 
two explanations could describe the actions of two different delegates voting on the same issue on 
the same day. The problem is complicated still further by the Great Compromise’s deeply 
intertwined place in many other debates on the floor. For example, the Convention settled on a two-
thirds majority of both houses of Congress as the required margin to override a Presidential veto. 
With only thirteen states in the union at the time, a coalition of small states could overpower the 
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President, but the feasibility of this would depend on how the delegates apportioned the legislative 
branch. As another example, the distribution of votes in the Electoral College stemmed directly 
from the Great Compromise.  
For these reasons, I do not hypothesize a uniformly positive or negative impact of economic 
interests on the probability delegate deviation as modelled before or after the Great Compromise. 
The difficulty in a prediction speaks to the crucial nature of the issue of legislative apportionment in 
the debates, and illustrates why the Convention almost broke apart several times in the leadup to the 
Great Compromise.  
5 Theoretical Considerations 
I am using a delegate’s observed deviation or acquiescence to his state’s majority in each vote as an 
indication of the relative impact of personal economic and noneconomic interests in two periods 
modelled around the Great Compromise. For example, if a delegate’s vote is contrary to the vote 
cast to the convention by his state overall, this indicates that some factor unique to that delegate 
overrode the interests he shares with his fellow state delegates for that vote. I model the delegate’s 
choice as the decision to vote with the majority, or independently. So, for delegate j, issue i, and state 
k, a delegate’s decision of acquiescence or otherwise is given by:  
𝑌𝑖
𝑗𝑘
= 𝑔(𝑃𝐸𝑗 , 𝑃𝐼𝑗 , 𝑃𝐸𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝑘)     ( 2 ) 
where PEj are the delegate-specific factors that are economic in nature, PIj are the delegate-specific 
factors that are noneconomic in nature, post refers to the period after the Compromise, and Ck are 
the state-level or regional controls.  I am looking to test if the same empirical model predicts voting 
behavior throughout the Convention, specifically, in the period before and after the resolution of 
the Great Compromise on July 16th, 1787. I hypothesize significant coefficients in the PEj and 




Two datasets inform the empirical testing in my research. One describes voting during the 
Convention, and I use these data to construct the dependent variable of a logistic regression model, 
as well as two controls—“size” and “even”—for structural elements of the delegations. The second 
dataset describes the delegates and the states. It informs the economic, noneconomic, and regional 
control covariates in the logistic model. 
6.1 CCRG Dataset5  
Out of 797 total roll-call votes during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Dougherty et al 
(2012) in compiling this dataset identify 620 that are substantive (non-procedural) and give state and 
delegate positions for each. Two primary sources are the dominant ultimate informants of the 
project: the official Convention journal, kept by Secretary William Samuel Jackson of South Carolina 
(who did not vote), and James Madison’s notes. Madison’s notes are a much more descriptive source 
of the content of the debates than the Journal, which gives little more than the question at hand and 
a tally of state positions. These sources, as well as the intermittent records kept by other delegates 
such as Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King are compiled in the comprehensive resource The 
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand (1911)).  
6.1.1 State Position Data 
The process of collecting state votes was relatively straightforward, given that Secretary Jackson 
reported each of the twelve6 attending states’ positions— “yea,” “nay,” or “divided,” on almost all of 
the 620 roll-calls. Missing state votes are primarily due to attendance, for a state’s position on a day it 
did not attend or did not reach a quorum is of course impossible to ascertain. Notably, no more 
than eleven states ever simultaneously attended the Convention with quorum (New Hampshire and 
 
5 Source: Constitutional Convention Research Group (CCRG) Website 
6 Rhode Island did not attend the 1787 Convention by its own truculent choice. 
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New York never held overlapping quorum). The challenges to empirical inference presented by the 
general state attendance patterns are unavoidable and thus common to all analyses of the 
Convention.  
In the context of this specific two-period analysis, New York and New Hampshire’s 
noncongruent attendances present special difficulty, because New York only voted before the Great 
Compromise, and New Hampshire only afterwards. Given these facts, does using observations of 
the New Hampshire or New York delegates deviating from their state majority make sense in a two-
period analysis surrounding the Compromise? I argue that it still does. Consider any New York 
delegate, on the floor of the Convention in its nascent weeks. He does not know what the future 
days of the Convention will hold, what the future legislature will look like, or that his state will soon 
be without quorum. His choice to deviate or not is the same as any other delegate during that time 
period. In the other case, the two men from New Hampshire entered a meeting grown to teenage, 
and so had no choice but to take its status as it stood. Specifically, all the decisions made by the New 
Hampshire delegation were accompanied by the knowledge that in the First Congress, it would have 
two Senators and three Congressmen, that all of the other states would have two Senators, and that 
it would stand above Rhode Island and Delaware, equal to Georgia, and below the rest in terms of 
Congressmen. Examining how economic interests manifest under these information conditions 
should not depend on whether the state was present for the Great Compromise vote itself, only on 
how its delegates acted on subsequent decisions. 
Not all of the missing state positions in the CCRG dataset are due to absenteeism. Sometimes, 
an irregular human error of Secretary Jackson’s resulted in his failure to record the position of a state 
on a day it attended. There are other examples of an inconsistency in the recorded vote of a state 
between the Journal and the records of Madison or some other delegate. In these cases, Dougherty 
et al either correct for the error, if such a remedy is obvious, or else omit a state’s position for that 
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particular vote. In the few occurrences of a state’s deliberately not voting, the authors do not record 
any position for that state7. Lastly, there are 51 substantive votes that Secretary Jackson did not 
number or list in the Journal. Generally, these are unanimous or close to unanimous decisions and 
so are not numbered presumably because Jackson did not think it worthwhile to tally state votes 
here. Often, Madison’s Notes give information on these issues that the official Journal glosses over. 
Dougherty et al are extremely conservative in their inference in cases such as this, by not recording 
the position of a state unless it is explicitly given by some record. 
6.1.2 Delegate Inferences in CCRG Dataset 
Compared to documenting the state positions, ascertaining the positions of the individual 
delegates required much more time and thoughtfulness on the part of Dougherty et al (2012). This 
process involved three steps. First, the authors accounted for delegations of one or two—for these 
votes, a delegate’s position must8 have matched that of his state. The authors consider inferences 
made with this first step as “known”. Next, Dougherty et al. inferred the positions of the votes a 
delegate spoke to directly during the convention, and on the day the vote was cast, as indicated in the 
Journal, Madison’s Notes, or some other record. Lastly, these authors compared inferences drawn in 
the second step to the majority vote of that state, to deduce how the remaining delegates of that 
state must have voted. For example, in a three-person delegation, two delegates must have voted 
together if the vote of the third is known and opposite of that recorded for the state overall.  
While the label “inferences” to describe the process of collecting the votes of the individual 
delegates may imply a certain amount of guesswork or imputation of the data, the authors were 
extraordinarily careful and logical in their choices to the extent that no position of an individual 
 
7 For example, on the first vote regarding Legislative Apportionment, NJ did not vote because its governor explicitly 
forbid it from voting against equality of state representation in the Legislature, and the delegation had not yet 
established a strategy for navigating this problem.  
8 The exception to this “must” is if a two-man delegation reported a “divided” vote. The authors examined these 
cases in the next steps of the inference process.  
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delegate given is not grounded in hard historical evidence. In their description of the inference 
process, Dougherty et al err on the side of no inference in the cases that primary sources seem 
unable to settle definitively. Additionally, the authors formally tested the validity of the main 
assumption of the three-step inference process: the second step turned on the assumption that a 
delegate’s statement always aligned with how he actually voted. Using the 61 observations for which 
a delegate’s vote was known by step one, and he also made a statement, the authors tested their 
assumption by checking whether these two pieces of information matched. In all but two rather 
idiosyncratic cases, a delegate’s vote matched his statement of intent—a result supportive of the 
validity of the individual delegate inferences given by the CCRG dataset.  
An issue presented by this process is that the data on individual delegate’s positions are more 
likely to refer to delegates from states with smaller delegations. I attempt to address this issue by 
controlling for delegation size in all specifications.  
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6.1.3 Creating Dependent Variable and Structural Controls 
Dependent Variable: state_dev 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of delegate deviation from state majority across all roll calls 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Delegate Deviation from State Majority, by state   
State NH GA NJ NY NC MD DE CT MA PA SC VA TOTAL 
State_dev =1 0 1 3 14 18 23 33 19 105 89 101 121 527 
=0 746 918 53 91 140 288 97 682 326 311 269 422 4,343 
Total Obs. 746 919 56 105 158 311 130 701 431 400 370 543 4,870 
 
Figure 1 charts the number of delegate deviations across each roll-call vote. While the number of 
deviations is symmetric, this figure brings to light the place of the Great Compromise among the 
votes during the Convention: While it occurred almost exactly halfway through the Convention in 
terms of time, about two-thirds of the total votes cast occurred after the Compromise. An 
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examination of the records explains such an imbalance: During the first half of the Convention, 
debates were longer, and votes were subsequently fewer and further between. As the Convention 
reached its close, and the delegates prepared to sign the finished document, the sheer number of 
votes increased in order to bring the meeting to its resolution. Since I am not interested in the 
overall likelihood of delegate deviation, but rather how the economic interests impacted the 
probability of delegate deviation, the even distribution of state_dev supports the potential for the 
following specifications to address patterns of interests, rather than some other concurrent 
phenomenon.  
Table 1 tabulates delegate deviation by states. Clearly, the distribution of dissentions across 
states is not as symmetric as it is across time or state. Notably, there are no observations for 
delegates from New Hampshire voting contrary to their state’s position, only one for Georgia, and 
only three for New Jersey. A strong sense of camaraderie amongst a delegation, an absence of 
voicing dissention, or some bias in Madison’s records could all serve as possible explanations for 
these low occurrences. That Virginia has the highest number of recorded delegate deviations from 
the state majority is not surprising, given that Madison (a Virginian) is the source of most of the 
delegate positions, and he would have been sure to record if his delegation acted in a manner he 
himself did not see fit. While this lack of a uniform distribution of dissentions across states is not 
ideal, note that states big and small, as well as north and south are all represented among the 
delegations for which we do have more observations of a delegate’s deviation. As I will outline 
shortly, these distinctions are of interest in the empirical model, and so the demonstrated data to 
those characteristics displayed here allows us to continue with this estimation strategy.   
Structural Controls: size, even 
Using the CCRG dataset, I construct two controls used in all specifications that address 
structural elements of each delegation with impact on delegate deviation. Larger delegations are 
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more likely than smaller ones to house some deviation, simply by their larger size. The size control 
measures the size of each delegation, specific to each vote. The two delegates who did not vote and 
are thus omitted from analysis of voting behavior are factored into delegation attendance for the 
short time that either did attend the Convention. The size of a delegation was not related to the 
population of the constituent state—the legislature or governor of a state selected the men who 
would represent it during the Convention, some of whom (for idiosyncratic reasons) never made it 
to Philadelphia.  
The occurrence of a divided state vote presents an issue in the state_dev dependent variable—
how can I measure deviation from the majority, in the 118 cases of a state failing to reach a 
consensus? The tabulations above of observed deviations simply drop the divided cases, and use the 
even control to compensate in the regression. A delegation of odd number cannot produce an even 
split (if every member votes) and so the even control speaks to the divided case.  
6.2 Descriptive Data 
Professor Keith Dougherty of the University of Georgia provided a full range of descriptive data 
for each of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention and for each of the twelve attending states. 
Covariates in the model include several measures of a delegate’s potential economic interest and a 
set of noneconomic contenders for factors influencing a delegate’s voting in Philadelphia. The focus 
here is delegate voting behavior, and so I omit descriptive data for the two men that attended the 
Convention and did not vote. Table 2 provides summary statistics and descriptions for these 
variables, as well as the secondary source that provided me the information. Original sources of 
these data are primary or historical sources (census data, biographies) employed by the author 
indicated in the last column of Table 2. I describe some of these variables in more detail following 
Table 2.  No other author has examined voting through measuring delegate deviation, and so I 
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selected the specific covariates to include by considering any sort of demonstrated empirical impact 
on voting suggested by the author in the source column for each variable.  






























Indicator for if the delegate owned any private 














Indicator for if the delegate owned any public 





























Miles from the center of a delegate's home county in 
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Number of years judicial at any level (no overlap), 
includes justice of the peace and attorney general 
H&D 
       
 
Regional Controls       
 
Deep South 53 .245283 .4343722 0 1 Indicator for if delegate is from GA, NC, or SC 
H&D 
New England 53 .1698113 .37906 0 1 Indicator for if if delegate is from CT, MA, or NH 
H&D 
South  53  .4528302  .5025335  0  1  
Indicator for if delegate is from GA, NC, SC, VA, 
or MD 
H&D 
Population  53  34.42777  21.49505  5.9096 82.1227 















Total population of each state in 1787 squared, in 
ten thousands 
H&D 














Equals 1 if delegate vote does not match state vote; 
0 if delegate vote does match state vote 
CCRG 
Post 4,870 .763849 .4247596 0 1 Equals 0 for votes 1-156, 1 for votes 156-620 
CCRG 
Delegation Size1 4,870 3.392696 1.718573 1 8 Number of delegates in attendance for each vote  
CCRG 
Even 4,870 .7513336 .4322843 0 1 
Equals 1 if delegation size is an even number for 
that vote, 0 if odd 
CCRG 
1In calculating delegate size, all 55 (rather than 53) delegates were used.  
Source: Heckelman, Jac and Keith L. Dougherty 2013. "A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention," 





Public and Private Securities: Public securities in the context of the Constitutional Convention were  
debt instruments that many states issued during the Revolution. In the years following the War, the 
patriotic (and wealthy) citizens who held these securities suffered losses when the newly freed states 
did not always honor these securities at face value. Private securities were shares in private land 
companies and canal and road development companies. The prospects of these companies directly 
related to the development of the Western lands. Beard’s thesis rests heavily on the impact of these 
securities on delegate voting at the Convention.  
Western Land: Ownership of Western Land also proved an important asset in the era directly 
foreshadowing “Manifest Destiny.” Jillison et al (1978) note that the “landed” versus “landless” 
dichotomy held some explanatory power in the rearrangement of voting blocs in the period before 
the Great Compromise.  
Distance to Navigable Water: Considering the significant difficulty of travel during the 1780s, the 
commercial interests of delegates representing more and less coastal eras plausibly differed greatly. 
As the delegates deliberated issues such as the powers of Congress to regulate commerce tax 
exports, the various commercial backgrounds of the delegates came into conflict. McGuire (1986) 
derive the measure of distance from a delegate’s home to the nearest navigable coastline. The results 
of this work found a relationship between distance to the Coast and the likelihood of voting pro-
nationally that is significant and positive for some specific issues, significant and negative for others.  
Hierarchical, Communitarian: The religion dummies in the Noneconomic Variable category are not 
necessarily part of the same set: Three delegates—Clymer and Wilson of Pennsylvania and 
Dickinson of Delaware—are both communitarian and hierarchical. Religions that are represented at 
the Convention but that are not included in the communitarian and hierarchical dummies include: 
Presbyterian, Lutheran, Dutch Reformist. Again, these data identify some delegates as one of these 
three religions as well as either communitarian or hierarchical.    
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= 𝛽1𝑿𝟏𝒋 + 𝛽2𝑿𝟏𝒋 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑿𝟐𝒋 + 𝛽4𝑿𝟑𝒌 + 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖 ( 3 ) 
Where state_devjki =1 if the vote of delegate j opposes the vote of his state k for issue i ; 0 otherwise 
 X1j=set of delegate-specific economic variables, for delegate j 
 X2j=set of noneconomic delegate specific variables, for delegate j 
 X3k=set of regional controls, by state k 
 post=1 if vote i is after the Great Compromise (vote 156); 0 otherwise 
 size=size of that delegate’s state delegation during each vote 
 even=1 if size is an even number, 0 if size is odd 
 ui = randomly distributed error term 
I am testing the same model with five options for the set of regional controls X3k:  
1. Regional: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Deep South (GA, NC, SC) 
2. Regional: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South (GA, NC, SC, VA, MD) 
3. Population Control (Total population in 1787, according to census) 
4. Population, population squared 
5. State fixed-effects 
As the dependent variable is binary, I am using a logistic regression model to test these hypotheses: 
Hypothesis A: 𝛽1, 𝛽2≠0, indicating that economic interests generally impacted the probability of 
delegate deviation throughout the Convention. 
Hypothesis B: 𝛽1≠0, indicating that the impact of a change in economic interest on a delegate’s 





Table 3: Logit Results of Delegate Deviations from their State Majority Positions 
 
Dependent Variable: state_dev 












































Num. of slaves  -0.000731 0.00257 0.000362 0.00234* -0.00204 
  [0.00253] [0.00311] [0.00151] [0.00177] [0.00510] 
Priv. securities  -0.239 -0.313 -0.0410 -0.239 -0.373 
  [0.645] [0.535] [0.463] [0.492] [0.860] 
Pub. securities  0.548** 0.862*** 0.993**** 1.005**** 0.550** 
  [0.426] [0.349] [0.314] [0.288] [0.301] 
Western land  0.402 0.282 0.324 -0.0123 0.623* 
  [0.362] [0.348] [0.441] [0.413] [0.437] 
Distance  0.00477 0.00393 0.00394 0.00293 -0.000267 
  [0.00766] [0.00690] [0.00705] [0.00666] [0.00546] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0001**** 0.0001**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0062*** 
       
Post-G.C. Interactions       
Num. of slaves  0.00546**** 0.00503**** 0.00407**** 0.00348**** 0.00366**** 
  [0.00152] [0.00141] [0.00150] [0.00129] [0.00128] 
Priv. securities  -0.354 -0.396 -0.402* -0.202 -0.172 
  [0.433] [0.428] [0.397] [0.404] [0.239] 
Pub. securities  -0.714* -0.739* -0.819**** -0.883** -0.350 
  [0.541] [0.564] [0.490] [0.517] [0.407] 
Western land  0.836*** 0.873** 0.801** 0.738** 0.253 
  [0.417] [0.454] [0.463] [0.399] [0.368] 
Distance  0.0278**** 0.0224**** 0.0179*** 0.0238*** 0.0192*** 
  [0.00850] [0.00674] [0.00869] [0.00925] [0.00970] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0008**** 0.0006**** 
       
Noneconomic Variables       
Rev. War Officer  1.159*** 1.171** 0.932** 1.342*** 0.919**** 
  [0.500] [0.643] [0.552] [0.554] [0.330] 
Hierarchical  1.488**** 1.116**** 1.225**** 1.145**** 1.033**** 
  [0.364] [0.250] [0.344] [0.338] [0.345] 
Communitarian  -0.137 -0.239 0.0484 0.206 0.285 
  [0.324] [0.297] [0.454] [0.487] [0.313] 
Age  -0.0108 -0.00511 -0.00955 -0.00395 -0.0144*** 
  [0.0134] [0.0145] [0.0118] [0.0138] [0.00587] 
Legislative Experience  -0.000430 0.0129 0.0392 0.0381 -0.0475* 
  [0.0323] [0.0302] [0.0315] [0.0344] [0.0309] 
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Executive Experience  0.0205 -0.000117 -0.00229 -0.0112 0.0412*** 
  [0.0228] [0.0197] [0.0192] [0.0198] [0.0174] 
Judicial Experience  0.0192 -0.0178 -0.0163 -0.00815 0.0494* 
  [0.0237] [0.0160] [0.0151] [0.00884] [0.0330] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 
       
Structural Controls       
Delegation Size 0.358**** 0.593**** 0.502**** 0.321**** 0.285*** 0.496** 
 [0.123] [0.181] [0.161] [0.117] [0.144] [0.280] 
Even -0.446 -0.448 -0.278 -0.271 -0.379 0.151 
 [0.412] [0.356] [0.300] [0.253] [0.353] [0.286] 
Post -0.353 -0.621 -0.655* -0.439 -0.391 -0.323 
 [0.281] [0.448] [0.493] [0.460] [0.413] [0.329] 
Deep South  1.080     
  [0.626]     
New England  1.670 0.989*    
  [0.706] [0.752]    
South   -0.216    
   [0.852]    
Population (ten thousand)    .0022647 0.0934*  
    [.0118] [0.07155]  
Population Squared     -.00009*  
     [.0000643]  
State Fixed Effects3      **** 
       
Constant -2.938 -6.112 -5.188 -4.551 -6.393 -4.857 
 [0.650] [1.259] [1.242] [0.900] [1.502] [1.361] 
       
Observations 4,870 4,870 4,870 4,870 4,870 3,205 
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1% 
2Observations from NH and GA are dropped here, see above for explanation. Logit results for all models without NH, GA observations are presented 
in the Appendix.  
 
Hypothesis A: 
Table 3 displays logistic regression results. The model regresses the economic interest variables 
in two periods and the noneconomic interest variables in one on the dependent variable of delegate 
deviation, for five methods of regional control. Across all specifications, the set of all economic 
characteristics are jointly significant in either period, meaning that before and after the Great 
Compromise, a delegate’s economic interests impacted the model’s prediction of his disagreeing 
with the majority position of his state. The set of noneconomic characteristics (modelled uniformly 
throughout the Convention) display joint significance consistent across all models, as well. These 
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findings from joint significance tests are broad results supporting the general practice of examining 
the voting patterns of the delegates as functions of their economic interests.  
Hypothesis B: 
The patterns of significance in Table 3 suggest the nature of the general influence of economic 
interests posited by Hypothesis A. Three of the individual economic interest variables support 
Hypothesis B by presenting significance (consistent across all five specifications) that is distinct 
between the two periods. These economic interest variables are: the number of slaves a delegate 
owns, the distance in miles from the center of his home county to navigable water, and the 
ownership of public securities. Table 4 gives the average partial effects of these significant covariates 
at meaningful values, corroborating the discussion of the nature and weight of each. 
Holding all else equal, the more slaves a delegate owns, the greater his likelihood to deviate after 
(and only after) the Compromise. While consistently significant, the marginal impact (reported in 
Table 4) on a delegate’s probability of deviation of an increase in slaveholdings never surpasses even 
half a percentage point, at any chosen point of evaluation.  
Holding all else equal, the further from navigable water a delegate’s county of origin, the more 
likely he is to deviate after (and only after) the Compromise. The same triviality of impact pertains to 
an increase in miles from navigable water.  
Holding all else equal, delegates who own public securities are more likely to deviate before (and 
only before) the Compromise. The only economic variable that is at all significant before the 
Compromise is the public securities indicator, which is significant and positive across all five 
specifications. The lack of other significant results in the first section of Table 3 indicates that the 
driver of the joint significance of economic interests before the Great Compromise is the public 
securities dummy. Table 4 shows a marginal impact of public securities that is slightly more 
interesting than the APEs of the other significant variables: The model predicts that delegates who 
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own public securities are around 4% more likely to deviate from their delegation than those who do 
not own these securities. While a 4% increase in probability exceeds a .005% increase, it still does 
not serve as a comprehensive explanation for delegate deviation. Still, the consistent significance of 
these three post-interacted variables, across all tested specifications, supports Hypothesis B.  
Table 4: Average Partial Effects for Variables of Particular Interest 
 
Dependent Variable: state_dev 
Clustered Standard Errors by State 
  
Regional controls; 
“South” as GA, 
NC, SC 
Regional controls; 
“South” as GA, 







State fixed effects 
 
Economic Variables       
Number of Slaves, Post:  =0  0.000245**** 0.000229**** 0.000213*** 0.000159**** 0.000370**** 
  [0.0000877] [0.0000733] [0.0000862] [0.0000609] [0.000117] 
Min=6  0.000253**** 0.000235**** 0.000218*** 0.000162**** 0.000377**** 
  [0.0000915] [0.0000763] [0.0000892] [0.0000628] [0.000122] 
1st quartile=53  0.000317*** 0.000290**** 0.000258*** 0.000187*** 0.000432**** 
  [0.000127] [0.000104] [0.000116] [0.0000797] [0.000161] 
2nd quartile = 80  0.000361*** 0.000326**** 0.000283*** 0.000203*** 0.000466*** 
  [0.000153] [0.000124] [0.000134] [0.0000912] [0.000185] 
Mean = 95.28  0.000387*** 0.000349*** 0.000299*** 0.000213*** 0.000486*** 
  [0.000169] [0.000137] [0.000145] [0.0000982] [0.000200] 
3rd quartile=101  0.000397*** 0.000357*** 0.000305*** 0.000216*** 0.000493*** 
  [0.000176] [0.000142] [0.000150] [0.000101] [0.000206] 
Max=300  0.000882** 0.000758** 0.000564* 0.000380* 0.000769** 
  [0.000482] [0.000391] [0.000359] [0.000235] [0.000401] 
Distance, Post: =0  0.00117**** 0.000978**** 0.000911** 0.00100*** 0.00211**** 
  [0.000326] [0.000302] [0.000478] [0.000406] [0.000768] 
Min=1  0.00120**** 0.000998**** 0.000925** 0.00102*** 0.00215**** 
  [0.000338] [0.000312] [0.000491] [0.000420] [0.000800] 
1st quartile=8  0.00143**** 0.00115**** 0.00103** 0.00119*** 0.00242*** 
  [0.000442] [0.000388] [0.000593] [0.000538] [0.00104] 
2nd quartile = 20  0.00191**** 0.00146**** 0.00124* 0.00153** 0.00293** 
  [0.000699] [0.000559] [0.000804] [0.000805] [0.00152] 
Mean = 41.38  0.00307*** 0.00216*** 0.00170* 0.00232* 0.00393* 
  [0.00144] [0.00101] [0.00130] [0.00151] [0.00246] 
3rd quartile=50  0.00365*** 0.00251*** 0.00192 0.00271* 0.00433* 
  [0.00182] [0.00124] [0.00155] [0.00187] [0.00280] 
Max=200  0.00199 0.00346*** 0.00395**** 0.00316 0.00182 
  [0.00197] [0.00167] [0.000585] [0.00262] [0.00204] 
Public Securities, Pre  0.037** 0.0432*** 0.0563*** 0.0490*** 0.0511* 
  [0.0199] [0.0191] [0.0233] [0.0210] [0.0346] 
       
Noneconomic Variables       
Rev War Officer: 0 to 1  0.0579*** 0.0586** 0.0528* 0.0655*** 0.0909**** 
  [0.0281] [0.0351] [0.0326] [0.0272] [0.0349] 
Hierarchical: 0 to 1  0.0743**** 0.0559**** 0.0694**** 0.0559**** 0.107**** 
  [0.0171] [0.0123] [0.0237] [0.0212] [0.0365] 
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1% 
Quartiles calculated among observations of a characteristic’s presence; ie. the average number of slaves owned among delegates who owned slaves is 95.28 
 
While a cursory look at Table 3 supports Hypotheses A and B, the Average Partial Effects given 
in Table 4 impede substantive conclusions regarding the impact of economic interests on delegate 
deviation, and the existence of concrete changes in voting patterns with the decision of the Great 
Compromise. Table 5 summarizes the fitted values for each specification and provides a context for 
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evaluating the importance of the APEs in Table 4. None of the APEs for the economic interests 
verge matching a standard deviation in either group (actual observed deviation or assent) listed.  
However, Table 5 also provides detail on the predicted probabilities made by the model. The 
range of all predictions made by the model provides a for evaluating the importance of the 
seemingly small marginal effects reported in Table 5: The highest probability of deviation across all 
specifications is 65.5%; the lowest is 0.4%, and averages (among all observations) range from 13.2% 
to 16.4%. These narrow ranges bolster the relative impact of a seemingly small APE. Table 6 also 
reveals how the minimum and maximum predicated probabilities are almost identical between the 
observations of actual deviation and otherwise (across all models). Consider the pair of 
observations—one of a delegate deviating, one of a delegate voting with his state’s majority—that 
the model controlling for population and its quadratic gave the fitted values of 2.2% and 3.2%, 
respectively. Given actual events, the 2.2% prediction is not surprising, while the 3.2% prediction 
seems out of place. So, a slight marginal impact has more potential for an actual effect on the 




Table 5: Fitted Value Summaries Across All Specifications 
 
 Observations1 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Observed 
state_dev 
=0 =1 All =0 =1 All =0 =1 All =0 =1 All =0 =1 All 
                
Fitted Value 
Summaries 

























































































































































































































1These summary statistics do not include the nine observations for Alexander Martin of New Jersey, a consistent outlier and maximum. No values 
changed meaningfully by his omission, except for the maximum.  
 
 The differences in significance and magnitude of impact visible between the five given 
specifications also renders information regarding the driving forces at play. Specifically, in Table 3 
the Western Land ownership dummy is significant in all specifications except for the state fixed 
effects model. Given the specific distribution of observed delegate deviation across the twelve states, 
the state fixed effects method required estimation without any observations from New Hampshire 
or Georgia. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives logistic results for the same specifications tested in 
Table 3, but with observations from the same ten states for all methods of estimation. Without 
Georgia or New Hampshire, the ownership of Western land (before and after) is not significant in 
any model. Table 6 lists the delegates who owned Western land at the time of the Convention. None 
of these men represented either Georgia or New Hampshire, explaining why eliminating these two 
states significantly changed the place of Western land holdings in all specifications. Omitting data on 
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delegates from New Hampshire and Georgia did not impact the significance of any of the other 
variables displaying statistical importance in Table 3. 
Table 6: Western Land Holdings by Delegate, State 
Delegate Blount Dayton Fitzsimons Franklin Gerry Gorham Lansing Mason Morris Washington Williamson Wilson 
State NC NJ PA PA MA MA NY VA PA VA NC PA 
   
 Under the two specifications controlling for state population, the impact of owning public 
securities is not the same as the other models—with population or population and population 
squared controls, public security ownership (both before and after the Great Compromise) is a 
much more significant component. Table 7 orders the states by their population, and tabulates 
public security ownership in each. The table shows that the delegations representing states larger in 
population are more diverse with regards to public security ownership. Additionally, the larger states 
of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania are neighbors in terms of population rankings, but not 
geographically. The combination of these two details helps explain why public security ownership 
appears as more important in models that account for the population size of the states.  
Table 7: Public Security Ownership by State 
State DE GA NH NJ CT SC MD NY NC PA MA VA 
Population (ten thousands) 5.9 8.2 14.2 18.4 23.8 24.9 32.0 34.0 39.5 43.4 47.5 82.1 
# delegates owning public securities 5 3 1 4 3 4 5 2 5 2 3 4 
# delegates not owning public securities 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 1 2 
 
Other Findings 
While not directly related to the main hypothesis concerning the interplay of delegate economic 
interests and the Great Compromise, the logit regressions in Table 3 give information on other 
variables affecting delegate deviation. Across all specifications, former Revolutionary War officers 
were more likely to deviate from their delegation’s majority than other delegates, holding all else 
equal. Table 4 shows the magnitude of the effect to be over five percent—a greater impact on the 
sheer probability than the model estimated for any of the economic characteristics.  
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Delegates ascribing to a hierarchical (Catholic, Episcopalian) religion were more likely to deviate 
from their delegation’s majority position than delegates of all other religions, holding all else equal. 
As with the impact of officer status, the weight of the impact of practicing a hierarchical religion on 
deviation outstrips that of the economic interests (in any period) that were the focus of the 
hypotheses here—Table 4 shows an impact of between 5.6% and 10.7% for this characteristic. 
Especially within the context provided by Table 5, participation in a hierarchical religion seems to 
have made a non-negligible impact on voting during the Convention.  
9 Discussion 
The findings supporting Hypothesis A speak to the dozens of projects since Beard that look to 
decipher if and how the economic interests of the Founders affected their voting during the 
Convention. The most general mission of this paper was to add one more perspective to the 
literature of economic interpretations of the Constitution. No previous author—empirical or 
otherwise—focused as I have done on delegate deviation from the majority. The finding that 
economic interests mattered during the convention is consistent with the results in the recent 
empirical literature, and reaching this end through different empirical means corroborates the point 
other authors (most prominently: McGuire, Ohsfeldt, Heckelman, Dougherty) have made. The fact 
that the state_dev dependent variable produced results consistent to the literature, and (I argue) is a 
more comprehensive and subjective measure of votes than others used, suggests that the 
development of this tool also could serve future projects looking to understand the Convention.  
While the logistic regression model found statistical support for Hypothesis B, the actual 
magnitude of these results is slight. Several factors limit the potential scope of this model. First, the 
available data is unavoidably limited by its primary source nature—the information recorded by 
James Madison cannot grow with time. An issue with potential resolution on the part of researchers 
is the convoluted nature of these debates. McGuire (1984) point out how logrolling and vote trading 
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would obscure the effects of voting out of economic interests, because these activities would result 
in a delegate voting counter to how he otherwise would. The same logic applies here: There are 
many aspects of the Convention that are inherently impossible to address at an empirical level. As a 
result, gauging exactly the impact of any economic interest is impossible. 
The Compromise was a decision that had everything to do with powers of the states in the 
federal government. As these results help to discern, the debates surrounding the Compromise are 
entangled with other decisions facing the delegates.  As one example, in discussing proportional 
representation, the delegates also needed to discuss how state populations would be counted. From 
these debates we have clauses in the Constitution regarding a census, as well as the 3/5 compromise, 
which held that slaves would count for 3/5 of a person for the purposes of taxation and 
representation. This description may shed light on the story behind the significance of the number 
of slaves variable, after the Compromise.  
The significance of the public securities indicator supports Beard’s general hypothesis. Beard 
held that delegates holding public securities were more likely to favor a strong federal government. 
Results here show that public security holders were more likely to vote contrary to their state before 
the Great Compromise, suggesting that speaking to this interest was perceived as more important in 
the period of determining legislative apportionment—perhaps when the shape the nation would take 
was a more unknown quantity (that could potentially favor public security holders).  
The distance variable’s positive significance after the Great Compromise may speak to another 
controversial and concurrent debate. Jillison et al (1981) define the Commerce and Slave Trade 
Compromise (Vote 352) as the next truly pivotal decision following the Great Compromise. This 
Compromise resulted in Congress’s prohibition on banning the Slave Trade until 1800, in exchange 
for shipping privileges (coveted by Northern commercial states). The particularities of this 
compromise are heavily affected by the Great Compromise (as much as any deal based on the 
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powers of Congress, since the Great Compromise determined which states would have power in 
Congress). Since the Commerce and Slave Trade Compromise came after the Great Compromise, 
the significance of distance in the post-G.C. period must be taken with this other event in mind.  
10 Conclusions 
Contemporary rhetoric frequently alludes to the motivations of the Founding Fathers, but the 
Constitution was born in a wholly different era: one in which the majority of the population lived on 
farms, in which a person rarely touched paper currency, and, most significantly, one in which entire 
economies rested on the backs of enslaved human beings. The antiquated language of the 
Constitution may suggest that it was a product of its day, but the injustices ingrained in the text 
substantively show the society from which it emerged. While the Convention succeeded in the sense 
that the United States’ is the longest-lasting written Constitution in history, the Convention itself is a 
telling and incredibly consequential manifestation of issues such as race that are deeply entrenched in 
the political and economic history of this country. These fifty-five men met for only four months, 
but during that time they managed to reconcile the interests of twelve sovereign states into one 
union. While the Constitution certainly is not a product of one mind or one set of interests alone, 
nor is it the product of some objective force juxtaposing the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Enlightenment.  
The empirical work here builds off of that of other authors who have studied exactly how the 
interests each delegate brought with him to the Convention appeared in this document. In modeling 
the course of the Convention in two periods around the decision of the Great Compromise, this 
research allows us to see exactly how the informational environment around a delegate affects how 
he sees the place of himself and his own interests during the Convention. Three personal economic 
characteristics: the number of slaves owned, the distance from a delegate’s home county to navigable 
water, and his ownership of public securities significantly impacted a delegate’s probability of 
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deviating from his state’s majority in a distinct way in the two periods divided by the Compromise.  
These results suggest the interplay explored by Pope and Treier (2011) between the Great 
Compromise and other issues explored contemporary to it at the Convention. In line with recent 
scholarship on the Constitution, then, these results uphold the standing that the Constitution of the 
United States can be seen as an economic document, and in part exists as a quilt of the interests and 
experiences of the Founders.  
Results here are slight and subtle, but the question posed is also intricate, and the dependent 
variable is an indirect method of measuring the manifestation of economic interests. Additionally, it 
is appropriate to reiterate in my concluding remarks that while economic interests seem to be 
powerful influencers in the creation of the Constitution, and acknowledgement of their impact on 
the origins of the U.S. government is important, these were not the only forces at play that summer 
in Philadelphia. Enlightenment philosophy, political theory, and unrecorded quid-pro-quos made at 
the Indian Queen tavern the night after a long debate certainly spoke their words, as well, in creating 
this “Supreme Law of the Land.” In the context of a convoluted and complicated meeting, the 
economic interests that do shine through are empirically even more interesting and robust. The 
trends here align with historic accounts of the convention, as seen in the description of how the 
significant economic characteristics and the Great Compromise were logically related. Results here 
still indicate that delegates were hedging some of their economic interests on the political structures 
that they were creating for themselves as well as the other Americans—alive then or not yet—who 
did not have the privilege of a voice in the ratification of the Constitution.  
And so, the Constitution and the Constitutional Convention should serve as both inspiration 
and warning for America of 2019: If fifty-five men of so staunchly idiosyncratic opinion could arrive 
at a consensus of such monumental scope in 1787, why is the recent Congress so unable to 
compromise on its yearly budget that a government shutdown is albeit route? A potential answer 
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embodies the converse: How can a system created by a few wealthy white men truly persist in a 
nation whose current existence is the product of 232 years of straining against that very entity? The 
results here do not contain the answers to these questions, but in striving to understand a specific 
facet of the Convention, I hope to contribute to the general understanding of the United States as a 





A.1Logit Results of Delegate Deviations from their State Majority Positions,  
NH, GA dropped 
 
Dependent Variable: state_dev 












































Num. of slaves  0.00167 0.00426* 0.00300*** 0.00319*** -0.00204 
  [0.00220] [0.00298] [0.00142] [0.00143] [0.00510] 
Priv. securities  0.0982 0.0216 0.330 0.240 -0.373 
  [0.539] [0.583] [0.343] [0.505] [0.860] 
Pub. securities  0.736*** 0.829*** 0.965**** 0.969**** 0.550** 
  [0.361] [0.349] [0.275] [0.270] [0.301] 
Western land  0.478 0.381 0.358 0.292 0.623* 
  [0.401] [0.376] [0.420] [0.456] [0.437] 
Distance  0.00360 0.00223 0.00235 0.00227 -0.000267 
  [0.00570] [0.00555] [0.00630] [0.00612] [0.00546] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0001**** 0.0001**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0062*** 
       
Post-G.C. Interactions       
Num. of slaves  0.00384**** 0.00350*** 0.00239** 0.00241** 0.00366**** 
  [0.00140] [0.00141] [0.00140] [0.00142] [0.00128] 
Priv. securities  -0.0739 -0.0760 0.0376 0.0315 -0.172 
  [0.279] [0.272] [0.307] [0.296] [0.239] 
Pub. securities  -0.444 -0.432 -0.496 -0.543* -0.350 
  [0.496] [0.494] [0.444] [0.391] [0.407] 
Western land  0.463 0.446 0.405 0.418 0.253 
  [0.365] [0.378] [0.389] [0.397] [0.368] 
Distance  0.0208*** 0.0176*** 0.0164*** 0.0175*** 0.0192*** 
  [0.00919] [0.00715] [0.00813] [0.00893] [0.00970] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0000**** 0.0002**** 0.0491*** 0.0700** 0.0006**** 
       
Noneconomic Variables       
Rev. War Officer  1.284**** 1.336**** 1.114*** 1.185*** 0.919**** 
  [0.396] [0.514] [0.479] [0.518] [0.330] 
Hierarchical  0.821*** 0.581**** 0.576** 0.618** 1.033**** 
  [0.209] [0.208] [0.308] [0.338] [0.345] 
Communitarian  0.0854 0.1000 0.225 0.255 0.285 
  [0.340] [0.302] [0.357] [0.395] [0.313] 
Age  -0.0132 -0.0103 -0.0138 -0.0126 -0.0144*** 
  [0.0120] [0.0115] [0.0120] [0.0132] [0.00587] 
Legislative Experience  -0.00732 -0.00480 0.0234 0.0227 -0.0475* 
 47 
  [0.0361] [0.0379] [0.0307] [0.0311] [0.0309] 
Executive Experience  0.0192 0.00741 0.00481 0.00339 0.0412*** 
  [0.0268] [0.0285] [0.0244] [0.0246] [0.0174] 
Judicial Experience  -0.00645 -0.0297** -0.0322** -0.0278*** 0.0494* 
  [0.0217] [0.0165] [0.0188] [0.0115] [0.0330] 
Joint Significance (P-Values)  0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 
       
Structural Controls       
Delegation Size 
 
0.184* 0.341*** 0.302*** 0.139 0.149 0.496** 
 
[0.125] 
[0.151] [0.137] [0.122] [0.123] [0.280] 
Even 
-0.0400 
-0.243 -0.150 -0.151 -0.190 0.151 
 
[0.343] 
[0.320] [0.286] [0.244] [0.254] [0.286] 
Post 
-0.149 
-0.467 -0.460 -0.322 -0.306 -0.323 
 
[0.242] 
[0.447] [0.440] [0.437] [0.404] [0.329] 
Deep South  0.627*     
  [0.488]     
New England  1.117** 0.842    
  [0.592] [0.699]    
South   -0.112    
   [0.796]    
Population (ten thousand)    0.000115 0.0195  
    [0.00942] [0.0562]  
Population Squared     -0.0000191  
     [0.0000509]  
State Fixed Effects3      **** 
       
Constant 
 
-2.294 -4.238 -3.785 -3.054 -3.556 -4.857 
 
[0.645] 
[0.912] [1.052] [0.801] [1.556] [1.361] 
       
Observations 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1% 
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A.2 Correlation Matrix 
  
 st_de size Even nslave dbank dsecr dland dist dfarm merchant revoffco hierar~l commun~n dengl age legis exec judicial south newen. dp. sou pop 
st_de 1                      
size 0.24 1                     
even -0.11 -0.19 1                    
nslave 0.15 0.2 0 1                   
dbank -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.02 1                  
dsecr -0.11 -0.43 0.09 -0.46 0.03 1                 
dland 0.17 0.34 -0.33 0.17 0.11 -0.17 1                
dist 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.1 0 -0.1 1               
dfarm -0.12 -0.23 0.07 -0.03 -0.24 0.02 -0.17 -0.13 1              
merch -0.11 -0.3 -0.03 -0.25 -0.08 0.28 0.02 -0.15 -0.11 1             
revoff 0.01 -0.19 0.17 -0.12 -0.32 0.2 -0.18 -0.18 0.34 0.05 1            
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